Notes from the Greenhouse World: A Study in Coevolution, Planetary
  Sustainability, and Community Structure by Worden, Lee
ar
X
iv
:0
91
0.
25
26
v1
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
14
 O
ct 
20
09
Notes from the Greenhouse World:
A Study in Coevolution, Planetary Sustainability, and Community Structure
Lee Worden∗,a
aEnvironmental Science, Policy and Management, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-3114 USA
Abstract
This paper explores coevolution and governance of common goods using models of coevolving biospheres, in which
adapting populations must collectively regulate their planet’s climate or face extinction. The results support the Gaia
hypothesis against challenges based on the tragedy of the commons: model creatures are often able to work together
to maintain the common good (a suitable climate) without being undermined by “free riders.” A long-term dynamics
appears in which communities that cannot sustain Gaian cooperation give way to communities that can. This result
provides an argument why a Gaia scenario should generally be observed, rather than a tragedy of the commons scenario.
Second, a close look at how communities fail reveals failures that do not fit the tragedy of the commons framework
and are better described in terms of conflict between differently positioned parties, with power over different aspects of
the system. In the context of Norgaard’s work, all these observations can be read as narratives of coevolution relevant
to social communities as well as ecological ones, contrasting with pessimistic scenarios about common governance and
supporting respect for traditional arrangements and restraint in intervention.
Key words: Gaia hypothesis, coevolution, sequential selection, adaptive dynamics, network dynamics, cooperation,
tragedy of the commons, whole systems
1. Introduction
James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis’s Gaia hypothesis
was aggressively attacked almost immediately when it ap-
peared in the 1970s. The hypothesis took a variety of forms
ranging from “atmospheric homeostasis for and by the bio-
sphere” (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974) to “She [the earth]
is now through us awake and aware of herself” (Lovelock,
1979), and opponents tended to two lines of attack. One
was to dismiss Gaia talk as “pseudoscientific mythmak-
ing” (Postgate, 1988) because of poetic descriptions of the
planet as a living organism or a conscious, deity-like being.
The other was by means of the newly emerging socio-
biological vocabulary of “self-interest” and the “common
good.” In the same period of time, evolutionary biologists
such as Richard Dawkins, E. O. Wilson, R. L. Trivers, and
G. C. Williams had launched a comprehensive attack on
the idea of the common good in evolution, exposing sce-
narios in which selection on members of a collectivity acts
against the well-being of the collectivity those individu-
als belong to. These scientists successfully made the case
that it is not sufficient to explain or predict an evolved
feature that serves a group of organisms, or even a sin-
gle organism, without explaining how selection acting on
the smaller parts — organisms or their genes — does not
destroy that feature.
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Central narratives of this project, in addition to Dawkins’s
“selfish gene” (Dawkins, 1976), are the prisoner’s dilemma
of game theory (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), Garrett
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), and the
“problem of collective action,” made formal by Mancur
Olson (Olson, 1965) and others. These models come orig-
inally from political science and economics, and language
is shared freely between evolution, politics and economics
when they are used. Through this “contact language”
(Turner, 2006), arguments about these issues in biology
tend to be indirectly about what is possible in the social
sphere as well.
The evolutionary attack on the Gaia hypothesis, in-
troduced by W. Ford Doolittle (1981) and taken up by
Dawkins (1982) and others, has come to be known as
the “problem of the population of one” (Barlow and Volk,
1992). The problem is that for the different species of
the earth to collectively regulate the atmosphere would
be a kind of cooperation, or common good, and so it must
be explained why species’ “evolutionary self-interest” does
not lead them to “free ride” and “enjoy the benefits” of
a well-regulated climate without contributing to it. While
this argument is closely related to Dawkins’s discussion of
“selfish genes,” it is best understood as a version of the
tragedy of the commons narrative structure, a connection
which Dawkins makes explicitly. Populations of organisms
stand in for animal herders, the climate takes the place of
the common pasture, and the “temptation” to accept the
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benefits of the common good without contributing is pre-
dicted to lead to collapse. This is called the “population of
one” problem in this context because while organisms are
given protection from destructive “selfish genes” by natu-
ral selection that weeds out unhealthy organisms, natural
selection cannot operate on the whole biosphere because
the biosphere does not reproduce and is not part of a pop-
ulation of similar entities, leaving the problem of how the
biosphere could be protected from selfishness.
Attacks on the poetic-mythical language of Gaia advo-
cates have subsided, as key figures including Lovelock and
Margulis have affirmed their loyalty to science and cast
their claims in the scientific language of biogeochemistry
and mathematical models. The “population of one” issue
is still alive, and Lovelock has even conceded the point
(Kerr, 1988).
Lovelock, with Andrew Watson, introduced the Daisy-
world family of models to demonstrate that a planetary
ecological community can act as a global control system,
keeping the climate within an optimal range for living crea-
tures (Watson and Lovelock, 1983). The impressive range
of Daisyworld models now in print does not resolve the
“population of one” question, because some Daisyworld
communities lose their ability to stabilize the climate when
coevolution among the daisies modifies their relationship
to the climate, though others do not (Wood et al., 2008).
In this paper I will present a series of models that pro-
vide evidence for “sequential selection,” a phenomenon
that can produce planetary ecological communities that
stabilize themselves and the climate on both ecological
and evolutionary timescales. Sequential selection is a di-
rect response to Doolittle and Dawkins’ tragedy-of-the-
commons-based challenges to the Gaia hypothesis.
A few recent modeling efforts (Downing and Zvirinsky,
1999; Williams and Lenton, 2007) have demonstrated model
communities that maintain environmental control on both
ecological and evolutionary timescales. Williams and Lenton’s
simulated biospheres achieve regulation via high-level se-
lection acting on an array of spatially distinct communi-
ties, a different mechanism from the one seen here, and
Downing and Zvirinsky’s models, while they demonstrate
stable biospherical regulation without high-level selection
and are rich in fascinating behavior, are complex and hard
to analyze in detail, and the authors do not develop the
arguments that I present here.
In this paper I present results from a model frame-
work that is designed to have the richness of Downing and
Zvirinsky’s models, together with as much as possible of
the simplicity and mathematical tractability of the Daisy-
world models. These models do not allow selection among
communities smaller than the whole biosphere. Addition-
ally, unlike previous models, in this framework the desired
climate is not specified by the modeler but negotiated by
the model organisms collectively. These models explore
when and how idealized global ecological communities can
achieve collective atmospheric regulation. Model simula-
tion results indicate that the tragedy of the commons sce-
nario can happen, but suggest it is much less of a danger
than attacks on Gaia seem to imply. Simple, uncontrived
examples arise in which such a tragedy is not an issue, and
it becomes clear how a global-scale self-organization pro-
cess can produce a sequence of persistent, self-regulating
biospherical communities.
2. Model Description
In the models I present here — the “GreenhouseWorld”
family of models — the atmosphere is represented by a
network of gaseous compounds and processes that trans-
form various compounds into each other. Transformations
happen both spontaneously, by simple chemical reactions,
and as a byproduct of biological activity, like the trans-
formation of CO2 into O2 by plants and other photosyn-
thesizers. Global temperature rises and falls depending
on the makeup of the atmosphere, and changing temper-
ature helps or hurts the creatures in the system. Each
population has an optimal temperature: it can only sur-
vive temperatures within a few degrees of its optimum,
and produces offspring faster the closer the temperature is
to its optimum. Simultaneously, the rise and fall of those
populations’ reproductive rates changes the atmospheric
balance, which feeds back into the temperature. Equilib-
rium requires whole-system coordination of all these vari-
ables. These models are not intended to reflect actual
climate dynamics realistically, only to provide a somewhat
tractable testbed for propositions about what is possible
in ecological communities.
Model equations are included in appendix A.1. The
technical details of these models are dealt with in detail
elsewhere (Worden and Levin, in preparation). Here I
will present as few equations as possible, and present an
overview of conclusions from the model experiments, ex-
plore further how exactly communities change, and discuss
the results in relation to coevolution and how global-scale,
sustainable ecological self-governance emerges and is main-
tained.
On a slower timescale than the above ecological pro-
cess, the model species coevolve, responding together to
their chemical and climatic environment at the same time
as they co-create it. This is modeled by a technique known
by its proponents as adaptive dynamics (Metz et al., 1996):
when the ecological dynamics are at rest, introduce a sin-
gle mutation — a small variant population identical to one
of the established populations, except with a small, ran-
dom positive or negative number added to its optimal tem-
perature — and continue the ecological dynamics. Some
variants thrive and old populations decline to extinction,
and long-term changes in the community emerge. (In this
model context, I use the term ‘species’ somewhat arbitrar-
ily for a lineage of populations, which is subject to gradual
evolutionary change as these variant populations arise and
replace their predecessors, and ‘community’ for the collec-
tion of coexisting species at a given time.) In this model,
variation is limited to these species’ optimal temperature,
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Figure 1: Material flows in a simple model ecological community.
The one population, N0, consumes resource R0 and produces R1 as
a waste product (solid arrow). R1 degrades chemically to R0 (dotted
arrow).
allowing them to adapt incrementally to whatever temper-
ature is currently found in the atmosphere.
This process of continuous coevolutionary change even-
tually comes to rest, and in extra-long-term experiments in
qualitative change in community structure, a new species
is added to the network at this point, with randomly as-
signed input and output resources and optimal tempera-
ture, and the ecological and evolutionary process continues
from there. As we will see, these simulation experiments
yield a significant conclusion — the emergence of stably
self-regulating communities by means of sequential selec-
tion — that directly addresses the “population of one”
question.
3. The simplest community
Figure 1 offers a very simple example of a model com-
munity structure. One species (labeled N0) consumes a
gaseous resource, R0 (its “source resource”), and produces
a different one, R1, as waste. Resource R1 spontaneously
decomposes to R0, making a sustainable cycle possible. I
assume R1 to be a greenhouse gas, such that if the entire
ecosystem were made of R1 the temperature would rise to
100, and R0 to be a non-greenhouse gas, such that if ev-
erything were R0 the temperature would drop to 0. The
shifting balance between R0 and R1 places the tempera-
ture somewhere between these two extremes.
The development of this model community in evolu-
tionary time is plotted in figure 2. The species’ optimal
temperature is initially 20, and it can survive tempera-
tures within 10 degrees of its optimum. This initial system
comes to an equilibrium in which the atmosphere’s temper-
ature is nearly 30, which is not optimal for the species, but
is survivable. As the species evolves, its optimal temper-
ature shifts upward, toward the actual temperature, but
each change in the species’ population dynamics leads to a
shift in equilibrium such that the equilibrium temperature
also rises. The difference between optimal and actual tem-
perature stays just under 10 degrees for a long time, but
continually declines, and ultimately the two temperatures
meet at about 48 degrees. When species N0’s optimal
temperature coincides with the actual global temperature,
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Figure 2: Evolution of optimal temperature in the model of figure 1.
Time is on the horizontal axis, measured in number of mutations.
Upper (dotted) line is global equilibrium temperature, lower (solid)
line is optimal temperature of population 0.
its evolution stops, and the system does not change any
further.
3.1. Evolutionary dynamics in the simple case: no tragedy
of the commons
Now let us interpret the behavior of this model, first of
all at the beginning of its history. This population requires
a temperature between 10 and 30, and temperature is de-
termined by the atmospheric balance that this population
creates. These organisms cannot conspire (except in the
etymological sense, meaning “breathe together”); they just
dumbly produce offspring as quickly as the temperature
allows them to. Without life, this planet’s temperature
would drop to 0. The N0 creatures raise the temperature
above 0 by exhaling a greenhouse gas, R1. As tempera-
ture rises above 20 and their reproduction slows, we can
imagine that that slowing could either speed up the rise in
temperature further (a positive feedback) or suppress it (a
negative feedback). Evidently it has a suppressing effect,
or the temperature would rise beyond 30 and kill the N0
population. Similarly when temperature drops toward 20,
the population’s response does not drive it further down,
which would be a destructive positive feedback. Instead it
raises the temperature, stabilizing it at a survivable level.
In this sense self-regulation prevails, and the birth rate
and temperature come to balance each other. Should we
view this as a counterexample to the tragedy of the com-
mons scenario, which predicts that global self-regulated
harmony should fail?
That would be premature, because that prediction should
be taken in terms of evolutionary rather than ecological
dynamics. That is, given a well-regulated biosphere, what
is to prevent an antisocial population from arising, which
takes advantage of the good conditions but does not help
maintain them, making conditions worse for all parties?
In this model, that would appear in the form of a vari-
ant population that flourishes in the climate it finds, and
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Figure 3: Community structure changing as ecological need arises. The first network pictured is randomly generated, and quickly collapses
to the second structure shown. Two new species are added in succession, the second of which brings about two extinctions. Further additions
and collapses follow, and the community repeatedly regains climate equilibrium when it is lost.
as it grows in number, either destabilizes the climate al-
together, or leaves the climate worse for all surviving or-
ganisms than it was beforehand. The difference between a
species’s optimal temperature and the actual temperature
is a convenient measure of species well-being in this model
framework. Reproductive rate (i.e. fitness) is directly de-
termined by that difference. Thus if a variant were either
to drive itself and the older type to extinction, or to in-
crease the gap between optimal and actual temperature
— which would lead to “evolutionary suicide” if repeated
enough — I would consider that an example of a tragedy
of the commons.
In this model, to the contrary, the temperature gap
declines at every step, until it reaches zero. By the above
logic, this is a counterexample to the tragedy of the com-
mons scenario. It follows that, at least in this model set-
ting, the tragedy of the commons and its related scenarios
involving selfishness, free riders, and defectors do not have
predictive power. “Selfishness” does not necessarily un-
dermine the sustainability of a common good.
In economics language, these tragic scenarios result
from a perverse incentive structure, which places the par-
ticipants’ short and long term interests at odds with each
other. Incentive structures that emerge in a given situation
may or may not be perverse. In each case it is necessary to
investigate whether perversity arises, and what determines
whether or when it arises.
4. Complex communities: how sequential selection,
driven by coevolution, can remove perverse in-
centives
A randomly generated community of atmospheric com-
pounds and species that transform them is generally not
viable as created. Such an assemblage tends to go through
a period of climatic fluctuation and one or more extinc-
tions. But an extinction changes the community to a
different, simpler, assemblage, that embodies a different
circuit of feedbacks. That configuration may or may not
be viable or stable, and if not it will collapse to another
community structure, which may or may not do better.
In this way, the community will find its way to a stable
form by repeatedly revising itself, if it can find such an
arrangement before going to complete extinction.
In simulation experiments on such random communi-
ties, this search for an ecologically stable subcommunity is
usually successful, for a broad range of choices of numer-
ical parameters. When such a community is found, the
process of coevolution may lead to further extinctions, or
the community may come to evolutionary stability with-
out loss. The resulting community, if total extinction is
averted, is stable on two different time scales, both ecolog-
ical and evolutionary.
Introduction of a qualitatively different species to an
evolutionary stable community may or may not disrupt
the community, and if it does, the above process of re-
vision and re-stabilization repeats. Figure 3 presents the
beginning of a sequence of community structures generated
by this cycle. This simulated community came to evolu-
tionary stability 17 times, passing through more than 25
network structures, before coming to total extinction.
4.1. Sequential selection weeds out dysfunctional commu-
nities
This process in which inviable community structures
give way to viable ones by a sequence of restructuring
events has been labeled “sequential selection” (Lenton,
2004; Lenton et al., 2004; Betts and Lenton, 2007), by anal-
ogy to the way natural selection removes poorly function-
ing organisms and cultivates those that are able to stay
alive and reproduce. Like Darwinian selection processes,
sequential selection can produce systems (communities,
rather than organisms, in this case) that are not sabo-
taged by the “self-interest” of the parts that make them
up. These ecological communities are stabilized by feed-
back processes in which global atmospheric temperature
is an essential component, making the dynamic stability
they exhibit inseparable from regulation of the climate.
Thus, in the process of sequential selection, these com-
munities discard configurations in which climate regula-
tion is undermined by any of the species present, or oth-
erwise ineffective, and organize themselves into configura-
tions where all species present contribute to climate con-
trol, or least do not sabotage it. In other words, sequen-
tial selection can get rid of communities with conflictual
incentive structures, at least those that are bad enough to
destabilize the community, and select communities with
generally harmonious incentive structures. This offers an
answer to the “population of one” question of why the
biosphere should not be undermined by bad actors. Se-
quential selection is very different from Darwinian natural
selection or other kinds of selection studied by evolution-
ists (to be discussed more below), but like those processes,
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it can counteract selection on smaller scales, producing
a larger-scale structure that is protected against “selfish-
ness” of its components.
5. Coevolutionary dynamics in complex communi-
ties: cooperation, betrayal, and power
These models tell a story of a sequence of stable com-
munities, punctuated by crises that flicker past as self-
regulation is lost and re-established. Is it correct to de-
scribe this as periods of cooperation, separated by tempo-
rary attacks of tragedy of the commons? Let us look in
some detail at how these communities fail.
First is an example where a new species is introduced
and an old one disappears. The first three images in fig-
ure 4 show these changes in community network structure.
When the new species enters this community, consum-
ing R7 and producing R1, resource R7 becomes far less
available than before. This reduces the flow to the two
resources and two species supplied by the decay of R7.
The first of these two ‘downstream’ species declines to a
very small population, and there is not enough left down-
stream of it to sustain the second species in line, which
goes extinct.
In dynamics terms, one would say that the old commu-
nity’s equilibrium is made unstable by the introduction of
the new variant, so that the dynamics leaves that equilib-
rium point, finding its way to a different stable attractor
at which one of the old populations is reduced to zero. In
ecological terms one might simply say that the new, invad-
ing species displaces a resident species. It is hard to see
this as a tragedy of the commons: is the new species more
selfish than the old one? The new community is very sim-
ilar to the old one, and both stabilize at about the same
temperature. An essential aspect of the tragedy of the
commons is that the selfish party suffers along with every-
one else, which does not happen here. We could say the
new species killed the old one, invoking images of warfare
or crime, but Hardin’s narrative is a bad fit.
Later in this community’s development, it acts out an-
other scenario, which we might call “evolutionarymurder,”
since one species is killed by the evolutionary development
of the others. In this case, the second of the two species
downstream of R7 is also killed as a result of the same
invader, but this extinction happens well after the intro-
duction, as a result of coevolution of the species together,
not as a direct result of the introduction. This unfortu-
nate species, like the one choking it off, needs to maintain
its source resource at a particular level in order to survive.
As the invader species evolves, becoming better adapted
to the climate, it uses its source resource more efficiently
and leaves even less of it in the air, reducing the flow to
the downstream species and eventually making it unable
to maintain enough source resource to survive. (For the
mathematically inclined reader, because flows must bal-
ance at equilibrium, the R∗ value for the upstream species
equals the downstream species’s R∗ plus the downstream
species’s population size [see appendices A.2 and A.3], so
that when the two R∗s become equal the population van-
ishes.)
This extinction happens gradually, the dying species’
population becoming smaller with each evolutionary step
of the upstream population, and finally vanishing, while
the overall community never loses its dynamic stability or
undergoes any discontinuous change.
The final collapse of this model planet’s community re-
sults from a catastrophic loss of biospherical self-regulation.
An invading species takes over the R1 niche from a pre-
decessor, displacing it and another species that is fed by
it (the two connecting R1 and R7). The gradual replace-
ment of those two species by the new one brings with it a
drop in temperature, very slow and slight at first, but then
accelerating as the cooling hurts the remaining three pop-
ulations and causes them to release more of their source
resources and produce less of their products, which shifts
the world much more drastically into a cooler regime. This
is a runaway positive feedback that can not be corrected
as extinctions cascade.1
This event does fit the tragedy of the commons mold.
The invading species is responsive only to its own drive
to reproduce, which has the side effect of destroying the
environmental conditions it and all other life require for
survival. In simulations I have run, this tends to hap-
pen after roughly 10 to 30 changes in community struc-
ture. From earlier discussion about distinguishing between
perverse and cooperative incentive structures, one might
think that each would arise about half of the time, but
that result indicates that perverse structures, in the sense
of those that destroy the community, are much rarer than
that. Since each species here can only survive tempera-
tures within 10 degrees of its optimum, and temperatures
range from 0 to 100, this can be taken as evidence for a
tendency for these communities to survive by negotiating
a stably harmonious order, beyond random luck.
Also, it seems likely (though the complexity of the sim-
ulations has so far precluded collecting sufficient data to
test this hypothesis directly) that as a community devel-
ops through addition and subtraction of species, it has the
potential to become immune to further invasion. When a
community is fully evolutionarily stabilized, a new species
can only invade where there is a resource with no con-
sumer. An evolutionarily stable community with an occu-
pant in every niche would be permanently safe from dis-
ruption.
1For those who may be inspecting these model results in detail:
this particular collapse seems to be a consequence of slight details.
It actually would not have happened if the separation of timescales
were modeled perfectly, because in that case all the existing species
would be perfectly adapted to the climate, and the invader would not
be able to displace its competitor. Instead, the existing consumer
of R1 is almost perfectly adapted to the current climate, and the
invader is just slightly better adapted. However, other simulation
realizations produce collapses that don’t rely on tiny imperfections,
since a newcomer can enter that uses an unused resource: there would
still be collapses if this kind of imprecision were removed.
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Figure 4: Species introduction and subsequent changes in community structure.
5.1. Ecological structural power
In the “murder” scenarios above, the only difference
between the murderer and its victims is their position in
the ecological network. Network structure facilitates this
kind of “action at a distance,” and also creates “keystone
species” like the primary producer — the species that me-
tabolizes resource R0, without which nothing else can sur-
vive because everything eventually decays to R0.
These situations are reminiscent of sociologists’ “struc-
tural power,” in which certain players in a community have
the ability to determine outcomes and induce others to act
in certain ways, by virtue of their placement in a social net-
work. For example, if one is in the only position bridging
two disjoint subnetworks, one can become a “broker” who
has a monopoly on information each group wants about
the other, or be especially creative by synthesizing ideas
from the two sides (this is a structural hole, as in Burt,
1992). Individuals who are well-connected “network hubs”
may have disproportionate influence over others. The spe-
cial positions found in these Greenhouse World ecological
networks are different from those standard cases, and there
may be an opportunity for fruitful exploration of these
kinds of structural effect in sociology or economics, as well
as in ecology.
There is also an exceptional condition that can arise
in these ecological models, which creates another kind of
“ecological structural power.” Every population in these
models requires temperature within 10 degrees of its pre-
ferred temperature. When the climate fluctuates, survival
depends on the presence of a feedback response to keep it
within range. Thus the ability of a population to affect
the temperature seems to be an important matter. Gen-
erally, all populations share control of the temperature,
in the sense that temperature shifts when any of them
changes slightly. However, there are exceptional commu-
nities in which equilibrium temperature depends only on
two species out of a larger community. I have seen this
happen in two ways. These are illustrated in figure 5.
In figure 5a, two species share a single source resource.
This is generally not possible because of a rule of compet-
itive exclusion that emerges from the ecological dynamics
(see appendix A.2), but it can happen for a single pair of
species, if the temperature can be steered to the one exact
value that allows them to coexist, which is exactly halfway
between those species’ optimal temperatures.
In the community of figure 5b, a similar condition arises
for different reasons. Here two species bring the tempera-
ture to a singular balancing point without sharing a source
resource. This network is divided into two parts, con-
nected only by the flows from the source resources of the
two species in question. The flow from a species’ source
resource is directly related to the difference between its
optimal temperature and the actual temperature (specif-
ically, it is equal to that species’ R∗, see appendices A.2
and A.3). Since these two flows must be equal at equilib-
rium, again, the equilibrium temperature must fall exactly
between these two species’ temperature optima.
As a result of this concentration of ecological control
of the climate, as these communities develop coevolution-
arily, the equilibrium temperature always falls exactly be-
tween the two controlling species’ optimal temperatures.
As those species evolve, the temperature changes accord-
ingly, and other species must evolve fast enough to keep
up, or they will die, since they cannot affect the tempera-
ture to keep it from going out of their range.2
These special power positions are also different from
the sociologists’ famous positions of structural power, and
arise from global rather than local processes, since these
interactions are mediated through the planetary tempera-
ture.
6. Sequential selection, multilevel selection, and
social-cultural coevolution
Sequential selection is very different from the selec-
tion processes described by theorists of multilevel selection
in evolution. For instance, group selection — survival of
groups that survive and reproduce themselves better than
others — can overpower individual selection in some cases
when the two conflict, helping groups to develop means
to keep defectors or free riders in check, or simply not
have them (see, for instance, Boyd and Richerson, 2002).
Similarly, individual selection can work against gene-level
2In practice this kind of extinction seems to be rare, since the two
controlling species’ optima, both evolving toward the actual temper-
atures, fall on either side of it, so the actual temperature tends not to
change too drastically and other species are generally able to follow
it successfully. Without further investigation, it is not clear whether
these cases are particularly important to understanding which com-
munities live or die.
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Figure 5: a. In this network, because species N1 and N2 share re-
source R0 by controlling the temperature, species N3 has no impact
on the equilibrium temperature. b. In this network, because species
N1 and N2 are associated with the resources flowing between other-
wise disconnected network components, they determine the climate,
and the other species have no impact on it.
selection, producing organisms that have means to keep
“selfish genes” in check or that do not have such genes (e.g.
Wilson and Wilson, 2007). While sequential selection sim-
ilarly interacts with lower-level processes, producing plan-
etary communities that are not undermined by “selfish”
organisms, it is strictly speaking a theory of change and
stabilization in an isolated system, whereas multilevel se-
lection processes act in a population of similar, coexisting
entities.
Strictly, then, if one were to try to apply multiple-level
evolutionary or coevolutionary narratives to the subject
how local or regional human communities change, such a
discussion should probably draw on ecosystem selection
(Swenson et al., 2000a,b) rather than sequential selection,
because of contact and competition between different com-
munities. Regardless, the two have much in common, and
some of the conclusions of the present model may be of
use in that discussion, and particularly in relation to Nor-
gaard’s image of a “coevolving cultural patchwork quilt.”
In a patchwork of communities, we can consider com-
munities coevolving with each other, and we can also con-
sider each community being shaped by coevolution among
its constituent parts. Sequential selection is an aspect of
the latter coevolution process. It is emergent from the dy-
namics of coevolution within a community in the same way
that Darwinian natural selection is emergent from ecolog-
ical population dynamics.
A long-persisting social/cultural/ecological community
pattern can be disrupted, or possibly even replaced, by in-
dividuals or social or cultural patterns arriving from some-
where else. Alternatively, disruption can come from grad-
ual or abrupt change within the community. In either
case, the community must from time to time either re-
spond to perturbation, in accordance with its own internal
processes, so as to preserve its patterns of organization, or
change structurally. It is reasonable to think that a period
of change may often be followed by arrival at a new pattern
that has some level of stability and persistence, and that
qualities that correlate with such persistent patterns are
more likely to be observed at a given time than qualities
that correlate with brief periods of change.
7. A Broader View of Ecological Governance
In these ecological models, sequential selection pro-
duces communities in which evolutionary incentives are
aligned to stabilize coexistence, unlike the tragedy of the
commons scenarios proposed by Doolittle and Dawkins.
When those stable arrangements do collapse, the dynam-
ics of the collapse also often do not fit the description of
the tragedy of the commons.
The fact that the tragedy of the commons narrative
structure does not accurately describe the events that shape
these communities, which are often better described in
terms of conflict, together with the possibility of an eco-
logical analog of structural power, echoes ecologist Peter
Taylor’s critique of the tragedy of the commons in inter-
national politics (Taylor, 1998, 2005): “negotiations and
contestations among groups with different interests, wealth
and power—the messy stuff of most politics—are kept out
of the picture. The ‘tragedy’ thus naturalizes the liberal-
ized economics of structural adjustment and obscures the
politics through which structural adjustment is imposed
and implemented in poor, indebted countries” (Taylor,
1998). The “negotiations and contestations” by which the
climate is collectively navigated by natural communities,
when seen more clearly than the tragedy of the commons
narrative allows, may help open a door to an understand-
ing of “ecological politics” that not only clarifies our eco-
logical theory but also helps to inform the crucial issues
of how we may negotiate our own issues of sustainability
and coexistence.
8. Conclusions
The Daisyworld models are presented as a “parable”
demonstrating that Gaian regulation is a meaningful possi-
bility (Watson and Lovelock, 1983). The GreenhouseWorld
models, like the prisoner’s dilemma and tragedy of the
commons, can also be read as a parable. Here is one read-
ing: common goods can in some cases be maintained with-
out tragedy; communities can turn out to be undermined
by selfishness far less often than pessimistic theories of al-
truism and defection would suggest; and when a disruption
arises in a community, it can often be a matter of conflict
between differently positioned actors rather than a tragedy
of the commons. This underscores the general points that
while it is valid to ask whether individual selfishness is a
threat to any given common good, the answer may well
be that it is not, and that beyond the question of how to
overcome the problem of selfishness are the equally impor-
tant questions of when it is a problem and when it isn’t,
and how to change the one case into the other.
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These contentions are surely uncontroversial among many
social scientists and others who work to expose the “messy
stuff of politics” obscured by economistic narratives that
deny differences in power and opportunity. Since evolu-
tionary theory often naturalizes narratives about selfish-
ness, altruism, free riding, and so on, and gives authority
to proponents of individualistic, ahistorical social theories,
perhaps these results can be of use to more institutionally
or politically minded theorists, and in creating space for
exploring scenarios of collective governance that are not
supported by Hobbesian narratives of greed and competi-
tion.
This paper’s theoretical results give support to the
claims of Gaia theorists: that planetary homeostasis by
and for the biosphere makes sense, and the planet can
be expected to have some self-healing mechanisms. They
also support some of the positions of skeptics, for instance
that the planet’s harmony isn’t invincible and can be dis-
rupted. They comport with a view of the planet that
avoids extremes and is compatible with a contemporary
understanding of climate science: there are global feed-
backs that produce the climate we depend on, and they
can be upset and give way to catastrophic runaway posi-
tive feedbacks. Both respect for the planet’s long-standing,
slowly constructed traditions of ecological governance and
careful, responsible stewardship are called for.
The community structures predicted by sequential se-
lection are not just an accidental mush of miscellaneous
elements. They persist because they are able to maintain
themselves, in other words because their overall structure
is coherent, sustainable, and self-regulating. That coher-
ence may have taken a very long time to develop. Dis-
ruptive interventions can lead to large-scale crisis and to
collapse into an entirely different order. This argument is
the same whether disruption comes from inside or outside
the system. It is an argument for humility and respect for
the wisdom of traditional practices and arrangements.
These models additionally offer an argument against
the use of tragedy of the commons scenarios to justify “de-
velopment” schemes such as structural adjustment (there
are many such arguments, but why not add one more?).
Group selection, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, social
norms of reward or punishment, privatization or authori-
tarian control need not be invoked to dispel the specter of
common tragedy. As in the curious little parables we have
reviewed, a long-standing social/cultural/ecological com-
munity of organisms and practices can, by means of the
self-organization process implicit in its history, have be-
come organized so that its constituents do not encounter
“temptation” that lures them to antisocial acts. Actu-
ally, disruption of an established order can introduce a
destructive incentive structure, with the expected tragic
consequences.
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Appendices
A.1. Model equations
Population sizes are represented by Ni, for i = 1 to np;
resources (atmospheric compounds) are Rj , for j = 1 to
nr; and global temperature is T . Each population has an
optimal temperature τi. Intrinsic population growth rate,
dependent on temperature, is
ri(T ) = Rs(i)u(T, τi) =
{
Rs(i)r0
(
1− (T−τi)
2
σ2
)
if positive,
0 otherwise.
Here s(i) indexes the source resource of population i, mean-
ing the one it consumes, r0 = 50 is a rate constant for pop-
ulation growth, and σ = 10 is the maximum temperature
deviation the population can tolerate. [In figure 3 σ is 16
rather than 10.]
Each resource is assigned a ‘greenhouse constant,’ or
heating coefficient, Hj . Additionally, p(i) indexes the re-
source produced by population i as waste, γ = 1/2 is the
populations’ efficiency of uptake of their source resources,
m = 1 is the populations’ mortality rate, ρ = 1 is rate of
spontaneous chemical reduction, red(j) is what resource j
reduces to, Λ = 1000 is the rate of temperature change
in response to the greenhouse effect, and M is the total
mass of populations and resources (which is constant over
time).
The model ecological dynamics are then
dNi
dt
= γ ri(T ) Ni −m Ni
dRj
dt
=
∑
{i|p(i)=j}
(1− γ) ri(T ) Ni
+
∑
{i|s(i)=j}
(m− ri(T )) Ni
+
∑
{j′|red(j′)=j}
ρ Rj′ − ρ Rj
dT
dt
= Λ

∑
j
Hj Rj
M
− T

 .
A.2. The R∗ result
Population sizes and resource concentrations at equi-
librium, in general, are hard to analyze in this system with-
out solving for all the system variables together. However,
there is a simple result for the source resource of a popu-
lation. Equilibrium conditions are found by equating the
model dynamics equations (appendix A.1) to zero. In the
case of the population dynamics equation, that gives
γ ri(T ) Ni −m Ni = 0,
which is solved either when Ni = 0, or when
Rs(i) =
m
γ u(T, τi)
.
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Figure 6: R∗(T, τ) as a function of T , for a population whose optimal
temperature τ is 45.
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Figure 7: For two species with different τ , R∗ is equal at only one
temperature.
This means that for any population that is not extinct
at equilibrium, its source resource must equilibrate at the
above level, which we can call R∗(T, τi).
It follows that if two populations have the same source
resource but different τ , since the source resource cannot
equilibrate at two different levels, generally one of the two
must go extinct. This result will be familiar to students of
Tilman’s work on resource competition in ecology (Tilman,
1982).
In this system, though, there is an exception to the
standard R∗ result, since R∗ is a function of temperature,
and population dynamics can change the temperature: if
the temperature can be brought to exactly the value where
two populations’ R∗ curves cross (figure 7), those two pop-
ulations can coexist at equilibrium. This is a real possi-
bility, as discussed in section 5.1. The crossing point is
halfway between the two populations’ optimal tempera-
tures. For obvious reasons, when optimal temperatures
are not specially chosen, this can only happen for one pair
of populations out of the entire community at one time.
A.3. Balancing flows
If we examine the resource dynamics equations at equi-
librium, as we did with the population dynamics equa-
tions to get the R∗ result, we learn how to associate the
population and resource variables with flows across the
network. The R∗ calculation tells us that at equilibrium
ri(T ) = m/γ. Using that fact, the resource equation at
equilibrium reduces to
0 =
∑
{i|p(i)=j}
Ni −
∑
{i|s(i)=j}
Ni +
∑
{j′|red(j′)=j}
Rj′ − Rj .
The equilibrium flows across the arrows in a network are
equal to the population size, for a (solid) arrow represent-
ing flow due to a population, or abundance of the decaying
resource, for a (dotted) arrow representing decay of a re-
source. This is a balance equation, expressing that the
total flow into a node of the network must equal the total
flow out of it.
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